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''State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III'' (ISBN 0-7432-7223-4) is a book by Bob Woodward, originally due to be published October 2, 2006 (but unexpectedly released two days early by the publisher due to demand), that examines how the George W. Bush administration managed the Iraq War after the 2003 invasion. It follows Woodward's previous books on the Bush administration, ''Bush at War'' and ''Plan of Attack''. Based on interviews with a number of people in the Bush administration (although not with George W. Bush himself), the book makes a number of allegations about the administration.〔 ''Newsweek'' magazine presented a special excerpt of the book. Assistant Managing Editor Evan Thomas and Senior White House Correspondent Richard Wolffe reported on the potential fallout for Bush and US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and analyzed the administration's response.〔(biz.yahoo.com )〕 ==Reported in the book== According to Woodward's book: * Andrew Card resigned because of concerns about how the public would perceive the administration's handling of Iraq in the future and that he had twice tried to persuade Bush to replace Rumsfeld. * Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met regularly with Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to offer advice on the War in Iraq. Kissinger confirmed in recorded interviews with Woodward that the advice was the same as he had given in an August 12, 2005, column in the ''Washington Post'': "Victory over the insurgency is the only meaningful exit strategy."〔("Lessons for an Exit Strategy" ). Henry A. Kissinger, ''The Washington Post,'' August 12, 2005.〕〔("Secret Reports Dispute White House Optimism" ). <-- Link is for page with section titled "Lessons From Kissinger." By Bob Woodward. ''The Washington Post.'' Oct. 1, 2006〕〔(Woodward On Iraq, Kissinger. ) Online video of ''60 Minutes'' interview. September 28, 2006.〕〔("Exit Strategy" ). Audiobook clip from Bob Woodward book, State of Denial.〕 * CIA Director George Tenet and J. Cofer Black met with then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on July 10, 2001, to warn her about an imminent Al Qaeda attack and were disappointed Rice wasn't alarmed enough by the warning, although Rice's friend Philip D. Zelikow (also executive director of the 9/11 Commission) also says in the book that the warning wasn't specific enough to enable the government to take a specific action to counter it (pages 49–52).〔() Frum, David, "David Frum's Diary" on the National Review Online Web site, October 5, 2006, 11:07 a.m. post "Blogging Woodward (4)", accessed same day〕 * Tony Blair repeatedly complained that the US government denied UK security services access to intelligence; although intelligence they collected was being stored on the SIPRNet, SIPRNet's classified information was barred to all foreign nationals, such as British and Australian troops in Iraq. After Bush signed a directive (along with Rumsfeld and acting CIA director John McLaughlin) ordering that "NOFORN would no longer apply to the British and Australians when they were planning for combat operations, training with the Americans or engaged in counterterrorism activities",〔pg 319 of ''State of Denial''〕 officials within the Pentagon instead began creating a parallel SIPRNet to which classified information would be slowly copied over after review. * Although members of the Bush administration publicly said the situation in Iraq was improving, internal reports and memos distributed between various government agencies, including the White House and the The Pentagon, acknowledged the situation was worsening.〔 * Senate Minority Leader (now Majority Leader) Harry Reid (D-Nevada) said of Bush, "I just can't stand him". Reid so dislikes Bush that he can't bear watching his speeches, instead having aides brief him on them afterward.〔() Lowry, Rich, item on "The Corner" group blog at National Review Online Web site, 4:20 p.m., October 2, 2006, accessed same day〕 * Condoleezza Rice hired old friend Philip D. Zelikow to go to Iraq and give her a detailed report (and gave him authority to go anywhere and ask anything). On February 10, 2005, two weeks after Rice became Secretary of State, Zelikow gave her a 15-page, single-spaced memo. Zelikow wrote: "At this point Iraq remains a failed state shadowed by constant violence and undergoing revolutionary political change."〔() Woodward, Bob, "Secret Reports Dispute White House Optimism" article in The Washington Post, October 1, 2006, front page, accessed October 2, 2006〕 * Robert D. Blackwill, the National Security Council's top official for Iraq, was deeply disturbed by what he considered the inadequate number of troops on the ground there. He told Rice and Stephen J. Hadley, her deputy, that the NSC needed to do a military review. Rice had made it clear that her authority did not extend to Rumsfeld or the military, and the matter was dropped.〔 * When Hadley replaced Rice as National Security Advisor, he assessed the problems from the first term. He told a "colleague" on February 5, 2005, "I give us a B-minus for policy development and a D-minus for policy execution."〔 * General John P. Abizaid, head of US forces in Iraq, visited US Representative John P. Murtha (D-Penn.) in Murtha's office and held up his index finger about a quarter of an inch from his thumb, telling Murtha "We're that far apart" on Iraq policy.〔 * "One of Kissinger's private criticisms of Bush was that he had no mechanism in place, or even an inclination, to consider the downsides of impending decisions. Alternative courses of action were rarely considered."〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「State of Denial」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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